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1. Introduction
*
In this paper the results of a series of standardized interviews of experts on their
evaluation of economic reforms of the 1990s in Latin America will be presented. The
experts are politicians, economists, entrepreneurs and representatives of trade un-
ions from all major countries in Latin America.
1 Additionally, there are some respon-
dents originating from the USA and Canada. The number of questionnaires that have
been distributed between October 1998 and December 2000 is 865, the number of
respondents is 351. From these, 30 could not be classified and were eliminated. So
the final number of answers included in the data is 321.
The general idea of the investigation is to analyze the data for countries and different
types of respondents separately. The respondents have been classified according to
the interest group approach (new political economy). The data is also classified ac-
cording to the countries' participation in preferential trade agreements.
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The answers should be indicative concerning the perception of the reform process in
Latin America from different political, social and economic perspectives and from
people (interest groups) which are supposed to be affected differently from structural
change caused by the reforms.
Due to scarce response from some groups in Brazil and Mexico (entrepreneurs in
both and labor in Brazil) the data set does not allow to break down the answers to
any single country or category. Nevertheless, there are some interesting features to
be found in the remaining set which will be presented in this paper. Occasional ob-
servations on the country level will be added whenever possible. It should also be
mentioned that the answers might be biased by the severe international economic
turbulences that have affected most Latin American countries during the research
period. Also the answers might not be representative in some of the countries due to
the deficits mentioned above.
* I would like to thank the following staff members for their engagement: Jan M. Henke, Yuyin Lu and
Martin Pieper who assisted the preparation of the empirical data. Jan M. Henke has also helped to
improve my English and Gisela Icks typed the various versions of the paper. Remaining errors are, of
course, due to my own responsibility.
1 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
2 The questionnaire has also been extended to capture this regionalization experience. The analysis
will be presented in a separate paper, however.3
The paper is organized in the following way: in the next section I shall begin with
some general remarks on the process of economic liberalization during the last dec-
ade in Latin America. Subsequently, the potentially critical aspects of these policies
will be discussed. In the third chapter the results of the questionnaire will be pre-
sented, and, finally, some conclusions will be drawn.
2. Latin America on its way from Import Substitution to Economic Openness
2.1 Growth experience under the reform policies
Latin America underwent a quite extended period of import substitution which was
partly enforced on the region when international trade broke down after the Great
Depression, and it partly became a distinct strategy after World War II. While some
small countries like Chile, Peru or Guatemala never managed to establish a viable
industrial sector under this regime, Brazil and Mexico had initiated a quite successful
first period of import substitution before the model ran out of steam in the 70s, and
eventually collapsed during the Latin American debt crisis of the 80s.
After Chile, which was a forerunner in the process of opening up, Mexico was the first
important economic reformer, starting its change of strategy during the second half of
the 80s. Brazil, the leading economic power in South America is one of the very late
reformers which severely began to redirect its views on international economic rela-
tions only after 1993.
During the 1990s and under the new economic paradigm, growth recovered in nearly
every country of the region. During the decade an average rate of 3.0% (after 1.4% in
the 1980s, but 4.9% in the 70s) has been registered. A first major effort to relate the
reviving rates of growth to the change of the economic regimes came from Edwards
(1995). Edwards estimated the reform efforts (macroeconomic stability, trade policy
reforms, incentive systems) of each Latin American country and classified the
economies as early, recent and late reformers. He found that early reformers (Chile,
Mexico and Bolivia) were those which had suffered most in terms of declining (and
even negative) rates of growth of GDP during the 1980s. In turn, those doing rela-
tively well during the debt crisis (Brazil) did not engage in (lasting) reform efforts
early. Edwards also realized that the early (and recent) reformers had a better growth
performance between 1989 and 1993 than the late reformers.4
Preusse (1996) used the Edwards data to construct a combined reform indicator
(macroeconomic reforms weighted 40%, trade policy and growth policy reforms 30%
each) for nine Latin American economies and found evidence of a positive link be-
tween reform efforts and growth performance from 1992 - 1994.
Since the reforms have been carried on after 1993 in most countries it is interesting
to see whether this link still holds during recent years and after a longer period of
time. Paunovic (2000) draws on an indicator elaborated by Morley, Machado and
Pettinato (1999). This indicator is quite similar to the one presented above but cap-
tures reforms until 1995. He correlates this reform index with the growth performance
of 17 countries during the 1990s and finds "that the reforms explain one third of the
variation in growth " (correlation coefficient = 0.60, R
2= 0,36) (Paunovic, 2000, 15).
3
Paunovic based his examination on the Morley/Machado/Pettinato index but differen-
tiated only between stabilization efforts and structural reforms. He then classified the
17 countries as strong, moderate and weak reformers in both areas. His classification
criteria is the standard deviation from the average index. That is, countries ranging
within one standard deviation from the mean are classified as moderate reformers
(index value between 0.803 and 0.839). Those above 0.835 are strong reformers,
those below 0.803 are weak reformers in the fields of macroeconomic and/or struc-
tural policies.
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3 Paunovic also mentions other studies which found a positive indication of the reform policies on eco-
nomic growth in Latin America5
Based on this classification one can easily construct a scale of reforms according to
table 1.
In this matrix we observe reformers which have a strong performance in both macro-
economic and structural adjustment. These will be called "strong reformers". A sec-
ond category of countries exhibits a strong performance in one area but a moderate
one in the other. Countries belonging to this category will be called "moderately
strong reformers". The third category are "moderate reformers", having a moderate
performance in both areas. Similarly, "moderately weak reformers" underwent mod-
erate reforms in one and weak reforms in the other area, and "weak reformers" have
weak performances in both.
Table 2 employs this classification (first column) in order to identify the countries' re-
form intensities (second column) in relation to their growth performances in the 90s
(third column). Again, we find a remarkable difference in the growth performance of
the different reform categories which ranges from 5.1% for strong reformers to 2.4%
for weak reformers.
4 To put it more clearly I compare the average of the growth rates
of the reform categories one + two and four + five. From this comparison one can
conclude, that on average the "strong" and "moderately strong reformers" have real-
ized an average rate of growth of GDP of 4.5% while the "moderately weak" and
"weak" reformers only obtained 2.1%. The intermediate category of "moderate" re-
formers obtains an average growth of 3.2%.
An important point to remember is that the GDP growth rates of the 90s include the
negative effects of the Asian crisis which drowned Latin America into a period of se-
vere depression between 1998 and 1999. Nevertheless, the relative growth perform-
ance of strong and weak reformers remained unaffected. That means, that the reform
countries, while also severely hit by the crises, did not suffer more in relative terms
than the weak reformers. It is also worth noting that the new figures are quite similar
to those presented in Preusse (1996). One important exception is Colombia which
fell back significantly in the second half of the decade, in both reform efforts and
growth performance.
4 The 1.7% average growth of the economies in the "moderately weak" category is due to Jamaica,
which has an average rate of growth of 0.0 for the whole decade.6
Table 2











































1 Classification following the Morley/Machado/Pettinato (1999) index, which combines two sub-indexes
of macroeconomic and structural reforms (as of 1995) which indicate three degrees of reform intensity:
strong, moderate, weak. "Strong" in the table means that both sub-indexes reveal strong reforms.
"Moderately strong" means that one index reveals strong reforms, the other one moderate reforms etc.
2 Classification and rates of growth according to Paunovic (2000).
To sum it up there appears to be increasing evidence of a strongly positive correla-
tion between growth performance and reform efforts in Latin America in the 90s. This
evidence even holds during the recent economic downturn which has affected all
Latin American economies (except Mexico) and suggests that the reforms should be
pushed forward in all countries and that they should be intensified in those where the
reform deficits are the strongest.7
2.2 Determinants of the public perception of the reforms
This is a straight forward conclusion based on economic rationale and derived from
an analysis of GDP performance. Public opinion may be different, however. The ba-
sic point is that the dramatic structural changes in the region have had severe distri-
butional consequences with winners and losers alike. The losers in particular may
oppose the opening-up process and undermine the political support for ongoing re-
forms.
In order to get an idea of the potentially critical aspects of the reforms and their con-
sequences for public perceptions of the new policies consider the following aspects:
1. People might compare the present economic performance of their country with
that of the 60s and 70s, when very high growth rates of GDP in Brazil and Mex-
ico pushed up the overall growth rate for the whole of Latin America to 4.9% be-
tween 1951 and 1980. This is clearly above the average post reform level of
3.4% in the 1990s. A prominent conclusion from this comparison is that the im-
port substitution (IS) model of the past has been much more successful than the
new open market regime and should therefore be revitalized.
This conclusion, of course, rests on the implicit assumption that the IS model
would perform equally well in the present as in the past, a possibility that even
benign critics of the import substitution model would deny. The basic argument
against turning back to import substitution is the growing conviction that this
model is only valid during a limited start up period (if at all) which definitely has
been exhausted in Latin America.
5 Following these critics of the import substitu-
tion strategy, it is misleading to compare the growth performance in the reform
economies with the hypergrowth period in Brazil and Mexico in the 60s and 70s.
Nevertheless, public opinion on the merits of the present reform agenda might
5 A popular date often presented to determine the end of the IS-era is the beginning of the Latin
American debt crisis (1982). However, many observers would emphasize that the debt crisis has in
fact been no more than the (visible) final stage in a process of economic destruction lasting for years.
During this process, many Latin American governments employed ill advised economic policies to
support the old regimes instead of changing strategy under consideration of the new national and in-
ternational constellations.8
still be biased because the glorious days of import substitution are used as a
benchmark.
2. The reforms might lend support to euphoric expectations about the future be-
cause the first steps are easier to implement and were often initiated during a
period of severe economic depression. Thus, a sudden rise in the growth rate of
GDP can be observed to happen quite often right after the reform program has
been established. This high growth performance is difficult to sustain, when the
costly period of restructuring really begins (Preusse, 2001). Thus, while the col-
lective memory of the true deficits of the old regime vanishes, the prospects for
future economic performance under the new regime diminish. As a result, the
perceived balance of the benefits and costs of the reform erodes.
3. Open economies may use the world market as a stabilizing mechanism in the
case of a regional economic downturn. However, they are also more vulnerable
to negative external shocks themselves. While the stabilizing effect of the world
market is not so easily recognized the external shock is! Thus, when there is a
concentration of negative shocks during the transitional phase (as it has been
the case in Latin America in the second half of the 90s) the experience with the
reforms might be biased and people will underestimate its positive effects.
4. Increasing growth rates of GDP in the reform economies have been accompa-
nied by adverse distributional effects. Thus, Gini coefficients rose in nearly
every Latin American country during the 1980 and 90s and rising income in the
90s was not enough to regain the pre-crisis level for a large part of the popula-
tion. Again, there is a suspicion that many people in Latin America do not see
the links adequately, which exist between the distortions produced by the old
regime and the negative distributional effects taking place thereafter.
6
5. Closely related to the problems involved in accepting the new regime because
of its perceived negative effects on the distribution of income and wealth is the
fact that opening up to the international market after an extended period of im-
6 To be sure, high and rising Gini-coefficients have been observed throughout the era of import substi-
tution, too.9
port protection inevitably enforces a re-organization of the industrial structure
according to comparative advantage and this will breed winners and losers.
While the arguments under points one to four are emphasizing the potential ímpact of
asymmetric information or even bounded rationality in the public perception of struc-
tural adjustment, the fifth argument is at the core of the economic problems arising
from any transformation towards an open market system, and it seems to be particu-
larly important in the Latin American context. Therefore, it will be helpful to elaborate
on this point in some more depth.
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Start considering the problem arising from a change from IS to export orientation in
the light of conventional (neo-classical) trade theory. Then, opening up will initiate a
change in the structure of industry and trade according to comparative advantage.
This re-allocation of economic activities will enhance efficiency and provide the basis
for lasting economic growth (gains from trade). In that way, opening up to the interna-
tional market is not a zero-sum game but will increase welfare for the society as a
whole. This conclusion is not disputable at all. What is disputable, however, is the
(implicit) claim that all members of society stand to gain from trade liberalization.
Neo-classical theory rules out any loser by assuming that a pareto superior situation
can always be established if compensation is paid by the respective winners.
But compensation of losers is a frequently (if not generally) neglected aspect of the
management of structural change. It must, therefore, be recognized that potential
losers will tend to oppose reforms which are against their (perceived) interest
8, and
this opposition will be the stronger the higher the adjustment costs are in the short
and medium run.
The expected change of relative (income) positions is analyzed in more detail in the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem (SS theorem). According to this theorem a rise in the
price of one of two goods (or bundles of goods) favors the factor of production which
is used intensively in the production of this good. Suppose, in an import substituting
7 The sensitivity of many Latin Americans with respect to the distribution of income and wealth is not
surprising due to the present state of affairs. However, it would be superficial to blame just economics
for this situation.
8 It is important to note that such a behavior is likely in this scenario despite the fact, that the open
regime, by producing additional growth, will also improve the situation of the losers in the long run.10
economy a bundle of exportables and a bundle of import competing products are
produced. Then, lowering protection means that the price of the bundle of export-
ables will rise (relatively) when the price of the import competing bundle on the local
market falls. Thus, if the exportables are labor intensive, labor will gain from this type
of structural change and the functional distribution of income will improve. In Latin
America this approach has some intuitive appeal. After the extended period of import
substitution the scope for change from relatively capital intensive (but disadvantaged)
to labor intensive industries (which supposedly have a comparative advantage on the
world market) should be wide. Thus, the gains for labor from the SS type of adjust-
ment should also be expected to be high.
Yet, there are two distinct features of most Latin American economies which might
diminish the effective scope for adjustment suggested by the SS model:
1. Resource-rich LDCs like those in Latin America use to have relatively high
wage-rental ratios as compared to resource-poor LDCs at a similar stage of
economic development (Krueger, 1977). Consequently, comparative advantage
in labor intensive activities is less pronounced in these countries and opening
up to the world market may bring a less significant shift towards labor intensive
industries.
2. The SS theorem is partly not applicable to the Latin American situation because
it is based on the assumption that the economy has one single wage rate (and
that is the one for unskilled labor). In Latin America, in turn, and especially in
the more advanced emerging markets, we have a considerable amount of
skilled labor. These workers are paid a "skilled" wage rate that is significantly
above the wage rate for unskilled labor, and they are concentrated in inefficient
(import substituting) industries which will have to adjust under the new regime.
Thus, it is the relatively well paid skilled labor force that will be hurt from trade
liberalization and the subsequent change to labor intensive industries: these
people might in fact be forced to leave the high wage sector and (if lucky) will
have to pick up a lower wage job in the newly expanding export sector. Since
these people are both well organized and able to defend their particular interest11
the opposition against this type of structural adjustment must be expected to be
strong.
Resistance to change would even increase if the mobility of capital is also limited.
This situation has already been analyzed in the so called Cairnes model and was
elaborated by Mussa, Neary and others.
9 In these models, capital is sector specific
and absolutely immobile between sectors. Consequently, it is not only labor which
opposes change but capital as well and both unify to lobby for extended protection.
Under these conditions, resistance to the type of change suggested by the conven-
tional SS process may be effectively blocked. That means, that either the whole re-
form project will eventually fail or entirely new lines of adjustment to trade liberaliza-
tion must be detected. In particular, the negatively affected industries (with capital
and labor forming a strong coalition) will argue that they are prepared to upgrade
along the existing lines of production in order to survive in the world market.
10 To
reach this goal they will most certainly claim a new period of adjustment assistance.
Leaving aside the apparent threat of this strategy (that is, it may just open up another
round of import substitution) change by upgrading as an alternative to change ac-
cording to the SS theorem would also alter the balance between winners and losers
of trade liberalization. First, export expansion would be less labor intensive and,
therefore, would not cause a significant change in the functional distribution of in-
come, if any. Also, there would be less pressure on industrial wages so that the resis-
tance to change which has to be expected from the skilled part of the labor force will
be smaller. Second, because the upgrading process aims at the development of effi-
cient lines of production in more sophisticated industries, it will probably need more
time than the SS process. Thus, it will not attract much new labor, both because in-
dustrial (export) expansion will be slower and the existing production facilities will
tend to absorb less additional labor. An additional threat to rapid industrial develop-
ment under the strategy derives from the fact, that technological upgrading must be
accompanied by skill expansion (and basic education). Since this is a time consum-
ing process, scarcity of the adequately trained workers may hinder a rapid expansion
9 See Cairnes (1874), Mussa (1982), Neary (1978).
10 This strategy also reigns the MERCOSUR approach of intra-industrial specialization with MERCO-
SUR as a precondition for the eventual integration into the world market.12
of capacity. Unskilled labor, in turn, will remain "unlimited" in supply and suppress
wages.
Overall, it has to be concluded that the upgrading strategy as compared to the SS
process will favor some of the high-skilled high wage workers in some sectors, and
this will happen at the expense of those still to be dismissed within the upgrading in-
dustries and those already unemployed.
It is necessary at this point to emphasize the situation of labor (both employed and
unemployed) under the two adjustment strategies, in order to highlight that quite dif-
ferent employment and wage scenarios must be envisaged under the up-grading and
the SS strategy.
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Under the SS strategy adjustment would take place according to the present struc-
ture of comparative advantage. Thus, this strategy would create more labor intensive
industries. These industries, in turn, would generate a maximum of new jobs albeit at
the cost of a non-increasing or even lower level of real wages as long as large scale
unemployment prevails. This strategy would have an ambiguous impact on the distri-
bution of income. First, the functional distribution of income will change in favor of
capital along the lines proposed by the famous Lewis model as long as unemploy-
ment prevails. Second, among labor we would expect both winners and losers. The
rapid job expansion will be clearly in favor of the formerly unemployed and these are
located at the lower end of the income scale, but skilled wages will remain under se-
vere pressure (see above). Thus, this kind of job expansion will help to decrease
wage inequality within the labor sector but it is against the interest of (employed)
skilled labor.
Under the upgrading strategy the economy would proceed differently. The weakness
of this strategy in terms of job creation has already been noted: in order to expand
these industries sufficiently rapidly (that is, to generate full employment within rea-
sonable time) the scarcity of skilled labor would have to be tackled forcefully. Taking
into consideration the marode education systems in many Latin American countries
11 Traditional models of neo-classical or classical trade theory are based on the assumption of full
employment and, therefore, rule out this aspect.13
and the long gestation period of investment in human capital it appears to be unlikely
that this strategy would produce the required expansion of jobs in due time. The ef-
fect on the distribution of income, then, would be the following: the functional distribu-
tion of income would not move in favor of capital as in the SS strategy, because the
scarcity of skilled labor would drive its real wage up. Unskilled labor, in turn, would be
negatively affected twice: first, because the generation of jobs would be generally
less than in the SS scenario, more workers would remain unemployed over a longer
time period; second, as the pool of unskilled unemployed would remain larger, the
pressure on real wages in this segment of the labor market would remain high and
may even increase over time. At the same time wages of skilled labor would rise, and
the distribution of income within the labor sector would become more pronounced.
To put it differently, the development along the upgrading path offers an immediate
and more equal participation of skilled labor in the growing value added of (relatively)
capital and technology intensive industries. This goes hand in hand with the stabiliza-
tion of the prevailing dualistic structure of unemployment. That is, unemployment will
stay at a relatively high level and a wage rate of unskilled labor will remain under
pressure for a longer period of time.
For those who believe that the situation of unskilled labor is the core problem of Latin
American economic development the SS approach would be clearly preferable.
However, those who would gain from this strategy are exactly those who are without
any sizable political power. It is unlikely, therefore, that they will be capable to articu-
late their interest
12 in a job maximizing strategy relative to those who are interested in
quickly rising real (skilled) wages. Taking these political aspects of the reform proc-
ess into consideration, a mixed strategy might be the most likely outcome. In this
scenario, some new labor intensive industries may develop which largely take the
burden of job expansion in the low wage sectors. At the same time the more sophis-
ticated industries with a relatively low degree of international competitiveness will try
to upgrade in order to survive in a more open market or simply fight for renewed pro-
tection.
Today, it is open to speculation which elements of this mixed process will ultimately
succeed. One approach to get some more information on this question is to investi-14
gate on the political perception of the reforms from the point of view of different
groups of society. This is what has been done under this project. The questionnaire
on the reform policies has been elaborated to catch some of the more important ele-
ments of this political-economic scenario. The following groups will be considered:
- entrepreneurs and workers (representatives of trade unions). Each group had
been asked to classify itself as belonging to a mainly exporting or mainly import
competing industry. However, in the analysis this differentiation could not be
employed, due to data insufficiency.
- politicians as those responsible for the reform strategy and (at least partially)
inclined to social welfare,
- scholars who may be most clearly aware to the potentially positive effects of
trade liberalization on consumer welfare and efficiency.
The questionnaire has been distributed in nine major Latin American economies
which include countries of each reform category according to the classification of
Paunovic (2000). These countries are listed on the right hand side of table 2 (page
5). Argentina, Chile and Peru classify as strong reformers, Uruguay classifies as
moderately strong reformer, Guatemala and Mexico are moderate reformers. Brazil
and Colombia are moderately weak reformers and Venezuela is a plainly weak re-
former.
With respect to the discussion of the particular positions of specific interest groups in
the adjustment process we would expect the following opinions to be reflected in the
data:
1. Overall, a positive perception of the reforms should go hand in hand with a ris-
ing level of reforms and the experience of higher rates of growth because this
would help to increase confidence in the future of the economy and weaken the
impact of potential anti-reform movements.
2. The reaction of capital cannot be anticipated with certainty because different
impacts may be at work. First, there is a positive effect on capital in the export-
ing industries because the discrimination of the export sector arising from import
12 To be sure, most of the people who form the pool of unskilled labor are not even aware of their fa-15
protection has been lowered. But, second, capital will lose relative to labor as
much as restructuring is of the SS type and it will even lose absolutely in the
import competing industries if up-grading fails.
3. Labor will gain relatively to capital under the SS conditions. It may, neverthe-
less, still oppose the liberalization strategy for various reasons. First,s o m e
downgrading of skilled workers is likely to take place and these will articulate
their discontent forcefully. Second, those who managed to enter the labor mar-
ket due to export expansion will possibly be less engaged in demonstrating their
improved conditions, and those who are still on the waiting list will not realize at
all that their situation is about to improve.
Under the upgrading strategy, the relative position of labor is not likely to im-
prove in the short to medium run as far as the unemployed are concerned, but it
will be more attractive for the industrial establishment. As the establishment is
well organized but the unemployed are not, the upgrading strategy will find less
resistance than the SS strategy. Overall, we would expect labor to be relatively
strongly opposed to the reforms, but less so in the more advanced economies,
where the upgrading strategy is expected to prevail. A positive response may
also apply, if the reform economy has a relatively low rate of unemployment
plus rapid export expansion. These conditions should be met more intensively
by strong reformers. Thus, opposition of labor against the reforms should be
lower the stronger the reforms have already been.
4. Politicians and scholars should be expected to be strongly in favor of the re-
forms, if they define themselves as representatives of the society as a whole
rather than of specific interest groups.
3. Results of the Questionnaires
There are six questions concerning the views of the 321 experts on the economic
reforms in Latin America. The answers are presented in the appendix tables A1 - 6.
Tables A 1.1 - 6.1 are organized as follows: in the first row, the average total is pre-
sented, next there are four sub-groups for MERCOSUR (MS), the Andean Commu-
vorable option.16
nity (AC), the Central American Common Market (CACM) and the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In the MS figures, Paraguay is not represented, but
Chile is. The figures of the AC are for Colombia, Peru and Venezuela. There are
some votes on Bolivia and Ecuador, but these are not given separately. Figures for
the CACM are only those of Guatemala. In the NAFTA context, Mexico is our point of
focus. There are only a few answers from the USA and Canada (14) which are no
more than indicative. They may, nevertheless, give a crude information of the distinct
perception of Latin American liberalization policies from abroad (e. g. from the North).
Figures for particular countries are shown underneath the regional groups wherever
possible. It should also be noted that the percentages given do not necessarily add
up to 100. Tables A 1.2 - 6.2 classify according to interest groups. The data is broken
down to MERCOSUR and non-MERCOSUR. The original questions are those given
as titles of the respective tables.
Table A 1.1 summarizes the answers on the evaluation of the trade reforms. A total
of 59% of all respondents do think that these reforms have been successful in their
own country, and only 26% deny the success of trade liberalization. When asked how
they see the situation in Latin America, quite similar results emerged (51% vs. 25%).
A break down of the data to the regional level alters the picture considerably and re-
veals important differences between regions and countries. In MERCOSUR, we find
80% positive votes and only 11% of the respondents think that the reforms had not
been successful. The views of the MERCOSUR members on other Latin American
experiences are less favorable (positive: 66%; negative: 14%)
13 but still reveal a high
level of agreement. This statement is also generally valid when Chile is included,
though Chileans do have less positive views on the success of trade reforms outside
their own frontiers.
Within MERCOSUR, Uruguayans have been most enthusiastic for their own coun-
try's experience (94/0) and also express a very positive opinion on Latin America
(72/6). Brazilians are most skeptical but still overwhelmingly in favor of the reforms
(64/27 for Brazil and 59/18 for Latin America).
13 In the following I shall use the notation (66/14) for the percentage of successful/not successful
votes.17
The interpretation of the NAFTA votes suffers from a lack of data on the USA and
Canada. Nevertheless, the few answers which are available from these countries
suggest that experts from the North have a far more positive impression of the liber-
alization processes in Latin America than Latin Americans themselves: all Canadians
and 80% of the US respondents think that the reforms have been successful both in
NAFTA and in Latin America. In turn, only 68% of the Mexicans agree but 21% dis-
agree. Apparently, Mexicans, though still in favor of its trade reforms appear to be
much less enthusiastic about the results than their Northern partners are. Also, Mexi-
cans appear to be significantly less convinced of the merits of trade liberalization in
Latin America (47/32).
In the Andean Community (AC) and the Central American Common Market (CACM),
trade reforms are seen as less successful than in MERCOSUR and NAFTA. In the
AC, a small vote in favor of the reforms is expressed from the point of view of the
own country (43/40) but there are less negative votes on Latin America (43/34).
These figures are very much influenced from the particularly negative estimation of
trade policy in Colombia (12/76). Interestingly, enough Colombians are also very
pessimistic on the results of these reforms in Latin America (24/64), an opinion which
is in contrast to any other evaluation. Peruvians (61/26) and to a lesser degree
Venezuelans (50/33) signal agreement on their own trade reforms but the former are
less convinced of Latin American reforms as a whole (44/26) than the latter (67/8).
The CACM (Guatemala) respondents are close to the particularly negative Colom-
bian figures (19/57 for Guatemala and 29/33 for Latin America).
The same type of question as for trade reforms has been put for the reforms of the
capital account. The results are shown in table A 2.1. Apparently respondents are
generally less enthusiastic as of the success of these reforms, both at home and in
Latin America all together (home: 50/33; Latin America: 39/32). Again, we find
marked differences between regions and single countries and again, the views are
significantly more favorable in MERCOSUR than in any other region (71/18). Also,
MERCOSUR respondents recognize a less sufficient state of affairs in other Latin
American regions (50/21). Within MERCOSUR, Uruguayans give a particularly posi-
tive vote (89/6) on their own reforms while the opposite is true for Brazil (36/41).18
Though Brazilians see the Latin American situation generally more positive than at
home they are less convinced of the merits of monetary reforms than are Uruguay-
ans.
Again, the NAFTA "own country" evaluation is for Mexico alone. Mexicans express a
particularly negative opinion on their own capital account reforms (26/58) and are
even less enthusiastic on Latin America (5/58). As with the trade reforms, the North
American views are far more positive (50/20 and 50/25). Only Guatemala exhibits an
even more negative evaluation of its own situation than Mexico does (7/67) but Latin
America as a whole is seen to be slightly better off (24/50).
The third question is on the effects of the trade reforms on different sectors of the
economy. In particular, I asked how experts evaluate the effects of the reforms on
different economic actors such as exporting and import competing industries, con-
sumers and workers. The respondents have been asked to indicate their preferences
on a scale which ranges from +3 (strongly positive) to -3 (strongly negative). In order




( + 3+ 2+ 1- 1- 2- 3 )
C = consumers
X = exporting industries
IS = import competing
industries
L = Labor (workers)
In the text, the answers have been compressed to Σ positive / Σ negative. Thus, for
example, (60/40) means that there are 60% of the respondents in the categories +3
to +1, and 40% in the categories -1 to -3.
Starting with the answers for the whole panel (total) we find that the positive impact
of trade reforms on consumers is recognized by a large majority of the voters (84/7).19
(Nevertheless, considering basic trade theory, it is remarkable that about 7% of these
experts disagree). Also in line with conventional wisdom on trade theory is the
strongly positive evaluation of the trade liberalization effects on exporting industries
(71/15) as compared to import substituting industries (26/62). Labor (workers), too,
are thought to be affected negatively. Note that the effects on entrepreneurs of import
competing industries and on labor appear to be nearly identical. Apparently, any
positive effect that might have been documented by labor originating in the exporting
industries has been outweighed by the particularly negative impact of these reforms
on workers in import competing industries.
Total
C 85/7 (37 - 33 - 14 / 1 - 1 - 4)
X 71/15 (30 - 29 - 12 / 8 - 2 - 5)
IS 26/62 (7 - 7 - 12 / 18 - 19 - 25)
L 29/50 (4 - 9 - 16 / 14 - 16 - 20)
To give a more detailed picture of the views articulated within the regions, the data
has been broken down to the regional level. First, we analyze MERCOSUR and find
that the positive effects on consumers (96/0) and exporters (78/14) are above the
totals,
MERCOSUR
C 96/0 (47 - 39 - 10 / 0 - 0 - 0)
X 78/14 (39 - 31 - 8 / 6 - 3 - 5)
IS 34/51 (8 - 8 - 18 / 19 - 16 - 16)
L 28/56 (2 - 4 - 22 / 21 - 17 - 18)
while the negative performance of the import competing industries is less pro-
nounced. The experience of labor, however, is said to be even more negative as it
has been in the total.
A break-down of the figures to the country level reveals that the answers have been
quite different. While all respondents reported (strongly) positive effects for consum-
ers and negative consequences for labor they differ in their evaluation of the effects20
on particular industries. For Argentina, with the best evaluation of exporting industries
(84/7) import substituting industries are said to be suffering (33/53). In Uruguay, both
sectors appear to be less successful: while exporting industries are still performing
well (67/27) import competing industries are a matter of concern (23/77). Brazil dif-
fers remarkably in the import competing industries which are doing well even after
the trade reforms (50/28), but exporting industries are performing worse than in Ar-
gentina and Uruguay. Even in Chile import competing industries are suffering more
than in Brazil (31/39). This is surprising in view of the fact that the impact of the re-
forms on labor is perceived to be particularly positive (46/17). The explanation might
be that strong growth of exports and GDP during the 1990s have helped to master
structural change without much hardship of labor.
Countries
Argentina Brazil Uruguay Chile
C 96/0 91/0 100/0 74/0
X 34/7 64/23 67/27 68/8
IS 33/53 50/28 23/77 31/39
L 31/52 18/59 22/66 46/17
The case of Brazil is puzzling. It is the only country where both exporting and import
competing industries welcome trade reforms (more than 50% of the voters see posi-
tive effects on trade liberalization even on the import competing industries).
Nevertheless, trade liberalization has its lowest acceptance of all MERCOSUR
economies among labor (19/50). To interpret these results, two points should be
considered. First, the Cardoso reform program of 1993/94 has been especially
successful in stimulating internal demand by raising income of the poor (see
Dornbusch, 19..) but is still hesitant in terms of structural reforms. Second, there are
only few respondents in the enterprise group in Brazil and these may belong to
multinational companies.
Next we turn to NAFTA. In order to analyze these data I show the answers for Mex-
ico and USA + Canada separately and in detail.21
Mexico USA + Canada
C 3 2-5-3 2/5-5-0 1 5-7 7-8/0-0-0
X 4 7-4 7-0/0-5-0 4 3-4 2-1 5/0-0-0
I S 1 1-5-2 1/1 6-1 6-2 1 2 0-8-7/2 2-3 5-8
L 5-2 1-5/5-2 6-3 2 7-2 7-1 3/7-1 3-0
In general, there is the same structure of answers in Mexico as compared to Latin
America. Consumers (69/10) and exporting industries (94/5) are among those who
are believed to gain from the reforms, import competing industries (37/53) and work-
ers (31/63) are the net losers. However, North Americans (USA + Canada) do think
much more positively about the Latin American reforms. They also realize that import
competing industries have come under severe pressure in a more open economic
environment (35/65), but unanimously see consumers (100/0) and exporting indus-
tries (100/0) as the big winners. Note that the impact of the reforms on labor is seen
to be positive, too (47/20).
14 Within Latin America, only Chile has articulated such a
favorable outcome of the reforms on labor. The answers from respondents from the
Andean Pact are in line with the total.
Andean Community
total AC CO VE PE
C 87/5 (45 - 31 - 11 / 1 - 4 - 0) 96/0 85/8 82/6
X 63/20 (21 - 23 - 19 / 11 - 2 - 7) 48/32 92/8 62/18
IS 14/85 (2 - 6 - 6 / 17 - 23 - 45) 12/84 16/85 16/84
L 20/52 (1 - 6 - 13 / 6 - 16 - 30) 24/68 16/55 19/63
Here, the impact on import substituting industries is seen to be very negative (14/85)
with more than 50% (45 percentage points) in the category "strongly negative". The
fact that the evaluation of the effects on labor is less negative supposedly reflects
more positive performance of labor in exporting industries. The answers for CACM
are not much different except for consumers. Apparently, in Guatemala, the un-
14 Note that the answers from USA + Canada do not include perceptions of politicians and entrepre-
neurs22
doubtedly positive effects of trade liberalization on consumers have not been recog-
nized even by people familiar with economic topics.
CACM (Guatemala)
C 63/31 (14 - 28 - 21 / 2 - 7 - 22)
X 57/23 (7 - 31 - 19 / 14 - 2 - 7)
IS 15/73 (5 - 7 - 3 / 21 - 21 - 31)
L 20/65 (7 - 3 - 10/ 16 - 21 - 28)
Before proceeding to questions 4 to 6 I shall analyze how the particular interest
groups themselves react to questions 1 to 3. The answers will be broken down to
MERCOSUR and non-MERCOSUR level only. Even at this high level of aggregation
the number of respondents is scarce, and the results are not more than a crude indi-
cation. From table A 1.2 it is obvious that all interest groups in MERCOSUR are
much in favor of the trade reforms. Non-MERCOSUR respondents are much more
skeptical in all groups.
Three points deserve attention. First, workers (trade unions) agree to the trade re-
forms at a 75% rate in MERCOSUR but only at 27% in non-MERCOSUR (here, 57%
indicate that these reforms have not been successful). Non-MERCOSUR workers
also believe that the reforms are unsuccessful in Latin America in general. MERCO-
SUR labor representatives; though less optimistic on Latin America too, still have a
positive meaning (50% successful). Second, scholars are generally less enthusiastic
about the reforms than politicians and they see more deficits in non-MERCOSUR
than in MERCOSUR. Entrepreneurs are particularly optimistic about trade liberaliza-
tion in MERCOSUR (88/6) but are skeptical in non-MERCOSUR (34/48).
On the general level, it has been found that the capital account reforms did find a
less positive evaluation than the trade reforms. This will of course be reflected in the
answers of the interest groups, too (table A 2.2). But there are some different percep-
tions on the group level. First, politicians from non-MERCOSUR do not give different
evaluations to trade and capital account reforms (52% in both cases) but MERCO-
SUR politicians believe that the capital account reforms have been much less suc-
cessful (63% against 88% for trade reforms). Entrepreneurs of non-MERCOSUR23
even give the success of the capital account reforms a higher rating (50%) than the
trade reforms (34%). In turn, non-MERCOSUR scholars and workers grade the capi-
tal account reforms particularly negatively (only 16/23%).
Last not least, MERCOSUR and non-MERCOSUR respondents indicate a signifi-
cantly less positive effect of the capital account reforms in Latin America in general
as compared to their home region. The difference is particularly strong among labor
in MERCOSUR (63 versus 25%) and politicians in non-MERCOSUR (53 versus
27%).
Turning to question 3 (table A 3.2) the data, of course, reflect the fact that exporting
and import competing industries are influenced differently by the trade reforms. Poli-
ticians and capital overwhelmingly share the opinion that exporting industries are im-
pacted positively (82/83). Scholars, too, admit to this evaluation (72%) and even
workers signal this belief (63%). In non-MERCOSUR all respondents are a little bit
more cautious except scholars (75%).
Import competing industries are among those which are in danger to run into trouble.
The data confirms this belief. In MERCOSUR slightly more than 50% of politicians
and entrepreneurs and 48% of scholars fear negative effects, and 63% of labor do.
Astonishingly, there is a relatively high percentage of workers who still see chances
for the import substituting industries (38% positive effects). Only 31%/36%/37% of
the politicians/scholars/capital share this view. Non-MERCOSUR respondents are
generally less optimistic about the future (adjustment capacity) of the import
substituting industries. Taking into consideration that the reforms in MERCOSUR are
in a more advanced stage (with a possible exception of Brazil) one is tempted to con-
clude that the costs of adjustment to trade reforms are much higher ex ante (in the
imagination of people) than ex post (in reality).
As for consumers, there is a wide spread belief in MERCOSUR that an open market
regime is favorable for them. In turn, between 7% scholars and 31% workers of non-
MERCOSUR respondents see a negative impact on consumers. The views on the
direct impact of the reforms on workers show a mixed outcome. In general, there is a
strong conviction among contestants that the reforms hurt labor. In MERCOSUR,24
however, the number of skeptics is smaller than in non-MERCOSUR. It is particularly
interesting that the MERCOSUR politicians and scholars evaluate the situation of
labor more critically than labor itself. This is not the case in non-MERCOSUR, where
both labor and capital bemoan the situation of workers.
Given the mixed reaction of the respondents to the reforms in particular countries
(and among interest groups) it would be interesting to know how these same people
evaluate the scope for further reform activities.I nquestion 4 (table A 4.1) Ia s k e d
whether people believe that the past reforms have been strong enough, not strong
enough or too strong. 58% of the total declare that the reforms in their own country
have not been strong enough and only about 5% said they were too strong. About
30% voted in favor of the present situation. This appears to be an astonishingly high
acceptance of the total reform process and underlines the results from questions 1 -
3. Also the majority accepts that the reforms need to go beyond the present state of
affairs. It is quite interesting to compare these answers (which apply to the sum of
each single country evaluation)
15 with the evaluations which apply for the whole re-
gion: there are significantly less people who are convinced that the reforms have
been strong enough throughout Latin America (20%) as compared to their own coun-
try (30%).
Still another point to mention is that respondents from MERCOSUR who conceded
that the reforms have been quite successful at home (see above) are nevertheless
not sure about the future course of action. About 43% declare that the reforms have
been strong enough to guarantee a sound basis for sustained growth and develop-
ment, but 48% meant that they have not been strong enough.
On the level of individual countries, the answers are quite different. In Argentina
(54%) and Chile (41%) the category "strong enough" dominated, but more Chileans
than Argentines would like to proceed (39/37%). In Brazil and Uruguay 68% and 67%
think that the reforms have not been strong enough. But there is no vote on the op-
posite position (too strong) in Uruguay while a considerable share of the Brazilians
(9%) would even like to remove the reform process. Though the anti-reformers are a
relatively small minority, they are more influential in Brazil (9%) than in Argentina
15 That is, people in each country have been asked to indicate the situation for their individual country.25
(4%) and Chile. In this latter country nobody was found who would like to remove the
reforms.
Despite the relatively heterogeneous structure of opinions on the country experi-
ences of the MERCOSUR members the experts have a distinct view of the situation
in Latin America as a whole. About 65% of all respondents (with only small differ-
ences between countries) declared that the reforms in Latin America have not yet
been satisfactory.
The situation is more critical in the Andean Community, and in Colombia and Vene-
zuela in particular. Only 4% (8%) of the Colombians (Venezuelans) think that their
reform programs have been strong enough. In turn, 92% of the Colombians and 85%
of the Venezuelans indicated that the reforms have not been strong enough.
Interestingly, Colombians are as pessimistic of the reforms in Latin America as at
home (92% "not strong enough") while Venezuelans recognized more clearly the dif-
ference between the region and their own lagged situation (85% versus 62%).
In Peru, where the Fujimori regime had implemented a particularly strong liberal
(economic) regime there exists an above average opposition against this policy (9%
"too strong"), but 44% would like to proceed on the reform trip. Peruvians also be-
lieve that Latin America as a whole has still a long way to go to keep up with the Pe-
ruvian reforms (73% "not strong enough").
In Guatemala, people are as discontent with the reforms as they are in Colombia and
Venezuela and they believe that they are running behind the scene in Latin America.
NAFTA again presents a dualistic picture. North Americans do have the general im-
pression that Mexico is proceeding in line with the rest of Latin America and that the
whole region still has room for further improvement. In turn, Mexicans indicate a rela-
tively high potential of resistance to further reforms (32% "strong enough", 16% "too
strong"). They also believe that their reforms have been much more successful than
those in Latin America: 74% mean that reforms in Latin America have not been
strong enough, but only 52% share this opinion for Mexico.26
In table A 4.2 the data is broken down to the interest groups. Politicians are equally
divided between "strong enough" and "not strong enough", but no claims that they
were too strong. Among scholars there are even 64% "not strong enough" votes but
4% said "too strong". The majority of entrepreneurs are voting for "strong enough" or
even too strong (48% and 4%). 12,5% of workers think that the reforms have been
too strong, but 45% express the opposite. Interestingly, there are hardly any votes
from representatives of MERCOSUR interest groups which would claim that in Latin
America the reforms have been too strong (4% of scholars and 3% of entrepreneurs
and most voters indicated for "not strong enough" (from 56% of politicians to 75% of
labor). In the non-MERCOSUR category all groups share the opinion that the reforms
have been not strong enough (between 67% of politicians and 78% of the scholars).
Among scholars, opinions are most polarized: 12% claim that the reforms have been
"too strong" and 7% "strong enough".
The next question was on the importance of a stable macroeconomic environment.
The answers to this question are important for the evaluation of the stability of the
reform process for different reasons. First, they might indicate the seriousness of
Latin America's turn away from structuralist theories of inflation and the (implicit) ac-
ceptance of inflation as a positive stimulance of economic growth. Second, econo-
mies with a notorious bias towards inflation (and inflexible or even fixed exchange
rates) use to be priority candidates of currency (exchange rate) crisis. One can,
therefore, hypothesize that a low level of tolerance of an unstable macroeconomic
environment indicates the seriousness of the dedication of people towards sound and
lasting reforms. Table A 5.1 indicates the views on this aspect of the reform pro-
grams. Only about 6% of the respondents do not estimate the merits of a stable mac-
roeconomic environment and another 6% are indifferent. In turn, about 88% declare
that sound macroeconomic conditions are important for growth. It is interesting to see
that there are only three countries in the sample in which the acceptance of macro-
economic stability is below 92%. Two of them, Mexico (68%) and Brazil (73%) have
been victims of a currency crisis during the reform era of the 90s. Leaving aside
these (important) cases it seems to be a common insight in Latin America now that
inflation is no way out of economic problems. This is an important change from tradi-
tional economic thinking in Latin America to internationally accepted rules.27
The strong rejection of inflationary policies is shared by all interest groups (table A
5.2). Between 94% of politicians and entrepreneurs and 100% of workers are in favor
of a stable macroeconomic environment. Only among scholars, structuralism has still
some proponents (12%). Non-MERCOSUR groups, too, are voting overwhelmingly in
favor of a stable macroeconomic environment.
Starting from this background I asked which type of exchange rate regime would be
convenient for the respective countries: a currency board (implying a fixed exchange
rate system), a flexible rate or some kind of mechanism that intents to stabilize the
real exchange rate. In table 6.1 a total of 21% opted for a currency board, 41% for a
flexible exchange rate, 35% for a stabilized real exchange rate. A break down of the
answers to the country level reveals that the currency board is in fact acceptable only
in Argentina. In Chile and Peru most voters would prefer a flexible exchange rate
(56% and 80%). 50% of the Uruguayans and 49% of the Brazilians share this view.
Only in Brazil, an absolute majority in favor of a distinct policy to stabilize the real ex-
change rate exists. This option is also favored in Mexico (58%).
The combined message of questions 5 and 6 is straight forward. Except for Argentina
with its unique acceptance of the currency board (a statement which may have be-
come obsolete, meanwhile) all countries are hesitant to fix its exchange rates defi-
nitely. This is despite the fact that macroeconomic stability is generally accepted now
as a precondition for long run development and growth, and inflation rates have been
kept at relatively low levels for quite a number of years. This lends support to the
supposition that it is not necessarily an exchange rate anchor that enforces low rates
of inflation but prudent fiscal and monetary policies at home which are born out of
political conviction.
Table A 6.2 reveals that also among interest groups the flexible exchange rate is a
favor. Only scholars consider the option "real exchange rate stabilization" as prefer-
able (40% in MERCOSUR, 49% in non-MERCOSUR). Non-MERCOSUR groups fa-
vor the flexible exchange rate system more clearly than MERCOSUR members. This
result is partly due to the fact that in MERCOSUR (Argentina) there is a large coali-
tion of politicians (38%) and entrepreneurs (43%) in favor of the currency board.28
4. Summary and Conclusion
Measured by GDP growth rates from 1991 to 1999 the economic reforms in Latin
America have been quite successful. Also the success is higher, the more intensive
the reforms have been. Nevertheless, due to the severe structural changes which
have to be carried out during the transformation from the traditional inward looking
economic development model towards a modern open regime, it is not clear to what
extent Latin American people really welcome this change of strategy.
In this paper the results of a questionnaire on the evaluation of the reforms have
been presented. The questions have been answered by 321 experts from different
groups of societies in nine Latin American countries, the United States and Canada.
The following opinions on the reforms prevail:
1. Trade reforms have found an overwhelming acceptance across countries and
among politicians, scholars, capital and even labor. The level of acceptance is
significantly higher in MERCOSUR countries than in non-MERCOSUR coun-
tries. In the latter, the majority of labor disagrees.
2. The acceptance of the capital account reforms is still positive but less so than
the trade reforms. Again, the adherents of the reforms are concentrated in the
MERCOSUR countries, except Brazil (the questionnaire has been spread in
Brazil in 1998/1999, that is, immediately before and during the currency crisis).
In Mexico, the majority of contestants expressed discontent about the monetary
reforms. This result confirms the still existing weakness of this sector in Mexico.
3. When asked how different economic groups have been influenced by the re-
forms the respondents expressed the following opinions: consumers are the
main winners along with exporting industries. Import competing industries and
labor are losers. This is a relatively skeptical evaluation. In lends support to the
thesis that the structural adjustment process is still under way, and the expected
long run effects of opening up have not yet fully materialized in many Latin
American countries. This supposition is enforced by the fact that the results for29
Chile (early and strong reformer) are much more favorable even for labor than
those for Colombia, Venezuela and Guatemala (late and weak reformers).
It is also worth to mention that in the smaller economies of MERCOSUR we find
a positive perception of the reforms on the exporting industries but particularly
negative views on the import substituting sectors. In Brazil, instead, import sub-
stituting industries are doing well, but not the exporting industries. This surpris-
ing result will surely be influenced by the Cardoso reforms which stimulated in-
ternal demand (particularly from low income sectors). However, it might also be
an indication of differing adjustment strategies in Brazil (internal upgrading) and
Argentina and Uruguay (SS process).
4. The forth question confirms the broad tendencies to be derived from 1 to 3.
Again, it should be emphasized that the reforms find a particularly strong sup-
port in the MERCOSUR countries (including Chile).
5. Questions five and six reveal a remarkable change in Latin America's views on
the merits of a sound macroeconomic management. Contrary to structuralist
conviction, low rates of inflation as a precondition for sustained economic
growth are not in dispute any more. As far as the adequate exchange rate sys-
tem is concerned, flexible exchange rates are ranked highest. The Argentine
"currency board", in turn, does not find many supporters elsewhere.
To sum it up, the lesson to be learnt from this investigation is that, at the end of the
1990s, the economic reforms in Latin America are welcomed by a broad majority of
this diverse set of experts. The fact that the opinions have been collected during
1998 and 1999, when Latin America (except Mexico) suffered from economic de-
pression, enforces this result.
Apparently the "mental" change from inward looking to outward oriented economic
development has taken place profoundly in MERCOSUR and, in particular, in the
smaller member countries. Also in Peru, a firm dedication towards the new economic
policies has been observed, though there is still a considerable amount of skepticism.
Contrary to this, in Colombia, Venezuela and Guatemala (CACM) where the reforms30
are lagging behind, there is still a much firmer belief in the old economic strategies.
This different evaluation of the reforms in the Southern Cone on one side and the
Andean Community (Colombia and Venezuela) and CACM (Guatemala) on the other
supports the thesis that success in the reform efforts breeds acceptance and paves
the way for further action.
The situation in Mexico is puzzling. Despite the fact, that the participation in NAFTA
has fed an export and FDI led boom which pushed GDP after the Tequila crisis,
Mexicans appear to be less convinced of the merits of the liberalization policies and
they also hesitate to proceed on the reform path. An explanation of this observation
is not that easy and may include such diverse elements as the difficult actual situa-
tion of local industrial firms (mainly due to the still weak banking and financial sector),
the particularly worrisome situation of the agricultural sector and - more generally -
the rapid and dramatic change in the official relations with the USA.
Last but not least, the observation that a large majority of Latin Americans have
turned away from structuralist theories of inflation and the implicit acceptance of soft
budget lines gives hope to the belief that, after decades of neglect, the provision of
adequate macroeconomic conditions for sustained economic growth will become a
standard element of economic policies in most countries of the region.31
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